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Abstract* 
Digital games have a tenuous relationship to reality; in most 
cases, they are rather simulacra than simulations, offering a 
simulation-like situation that does not relate to any preceding 
reality but creates a virtual world precedented only in other 
fictional or virtual works. The visuals of mainstream, Triple-A 
games counteract this ontological disconnect through an 
overabundance of detail and flourish in a perennial struggle for 
verisimilitude. This paper discusses two examples which, while 
generally adhering to this convention, introduce elements of 
subversion into their visual logic. It will show that there are 
various metaleptic ludic devices – such as virtual reality 
environments within virtual worlds and reality-changing 
paintings – with which contemporary digital games reflect 
subtly upon their own relationship to reality, and upon the 
player’s oscillation between agency and powerlessness. 
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Introduction 
Games are culturally situated artefacts. Coming from a 
humanistic perspective, studying them as such entails that their 
allusions and subtexts are analyzed, which regularly provokes 
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suspicions of over-interpretation, or, more radically, declarations 
of the absolute subjectivity of all interpretation. To show that an 
artefact encourages recipients to pay attention to specific aspects 
of itself, it has been an established practice since the inception of 
Russian Formalism to point towards moments of rupture, 
alienation, or estrangement. What these concepts share is the 
idea that many elements of an artefact are conventionalized in 
their content or mode of representation to the point where they 
become transparent or even invisble, and that there are aesthetic 
devices to counteract this.  
There are many such devices, yet one of the most ubiquitous 
and powerful are in-game images, an as-of-yet largely under-
studied phenomenon in digital games. By in-game images, I 
mean pictures (and to a lesser degree films) in digital games 
which are represented as pictorial material within the 
gameworld, as opposed to textures, skins, etc. which are 
semiotically coded as natural surfaces of objects. The most 
common types of in-game pictures are paintings, photographs, 
commercial posters and billboards in gameworlds. In many, if 
not by now most games in virtual world, various types of images 
act as illustrations of the morals and aesthetics of their worlds, 
and more often than not, they carry more than the apparent, 
face-value meaning. 
It is surprising that there is relatively little research on this 
area. On the one hand, many closely connected phenomena have 
been studied at some length: digital games’ indebtedness to art-
historical traditions [36], in-game photography [21] [46], art 
games and game art [50] [52], with German scholars even 
declaring a ‘visual turn of game studies’ [7] [25] nearly ten years 
ago. On the other hand, there are plenty of games that not only 
prominently feature in-game images, but make interaction with 
them both the central game mechanic and a structural metaphor. 
Especially paintings quite frequently feature prominently in 
games, e.g. The Unfinished Swan [22] and Layers of Fear [8], and 
in these as in other examples, the ontological status of images is 
often quite challenging: not only can they be the actual subject 
matter of both narrative and gameplay, they function as 
gateways to other parts of the gameworld (like the warp 
paintings in Super Mario Odyssey [44]) or contain complete 
world, such as the Painted World of Ariamis in Dark Souls [19] 
(that can only be entered if the Peculiar Doll, found only by 
backtracking to the starting position of the game, is carried by 
the avatar). 
We are still nowhere near having a robust, general 
understanding of representation in digital games, and it would 
therefore be preposterous to attempt a functional and/or 
aesthetic definition of in-game images here. This article focuses 
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on one function of in-game images, their meta-referential 
capabilities. What I want to demonstrate is that in both analyzed 
example games, in-game images are used to blur the line 
between reproduction and production of reality. Whereas in 
reality, we have traditionally accepted that images can be 
referential or illusioninstic (trompe-l'oeil), digital technologies 
like CGI, VR and digital games increasingly confront us with 
images that actively produce (virtual) realities, calling into 
question many established ways of thinking about the ontologic 
status of images. Both games render this media-technological 
moment of instability tangible in the use of their in-game 
images, defamiliarizing not only those images themselves, but by 
extension the whole apparatus of the games they are embedded 
in. As such, in-game images are, within the scope of this paper, 
particularly interesting as defamiliarizing devices that allow 
games to reflect upon themselves, or more specifically, their 
individual as well as generic aesthetic possibilities. To outline 
this dimension, questions of ontology and referentiality will be 
discussed only in as much as necessary, paying particular 
attention to the approach to metareferentiality developed by 
German media theorist Werner Wolf as well as visual theories of 
Edmund Husserl’s and Nelson Goodman’s.  
These theories will be applied to two especially intricate 
examples of digital games which use in-game images. Both 
Dishonored 2 [5] and Prey [6] foreground the tenuous 
relationship between digital games and the reality they 
depict/simulate, and the simultaneously empowered and 
powerless subject position of the player. While these issues 
might seem to be disconnected at first, I will show that the two 
examples construct their gameworlds, gameplay, and narrative 
in codependent ways that thematize the role of the player, and 
that they do so prominently through their use of in-game 
images. 
To make this argument, I will first situate the two games 
within a genre- and design-context that frames the role of their 
players and connect them to theories of agency and philosophy 
of action. The next section gives an overview of the use of in-
game images, followed by a section connecting simulation, 
virtuality, and referentiality with visuality to enable a more 
profound discussion of the games’ aesthetics. These theoretical 
considerations will then be used in analyses of the two examples 
in the final section.†  
Dishonored 2 and Prey and the ‘immersive 
simulation’ tradition 
Dishonored 2 and Prey were released within less than a year of 
each other in 2016/2017. They were both developed by Arkane 
Studios, a developer with studios in France and the USA, which 
is part of the ZeniMax Media corporation that also owns 
                                                                
† Given that this argument already touches on several central theories of game 
studies, I have decided to treat the player-avatar relationship as well as questions of 
immersion as subordinate for the purposes of this paper. With regard to the 
relationship between the player and her representation in the gameworld, I’m 
following Daniel Vella’s distinction between the ludically functional avatar and the 
fictional player-character [54]. In terms of immersion, I subscribe to Gordon 
Calleja’s view of the phenomenon as a combination of different forms of 
engagement and incorporation [11]. 
publisher Bethesda Softworks. Arkane’s founder Raphaël 
Colantonio and Harvey Smith were game directors on the two 
titles, with Smith overseeing the development of Dishonored 2 at 
the French branch and Colantonio and the American team in 
charge of Prey. 
The two games in question can be contextualized both within 
their narrower generic frame of immersive simulations and the 
wider of Triple-A action games as representative of a recent 
trend towards more daring and mature projects. Following the 
financial and critical success of their mainstays, the Elder 
Scrolls- and Fallout-Franchises, Publisher Bethesda has backed 
several games that were ambitious in unexpected ways. More 
specifically, though, both games belong in the tradition of what 
Warren Spector, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the genre, calls 
“immersive simulations” [51], also known among fans as “451 
games” for their recurrent use of that number – a reference to 
Ray Bradbury’s novel and its dystopian view of the future – as a 
code for safes and locks. Although superficially similar to 
computer roleplaying games [55] and First-Person Shooters [56], 
they are usually not understood as belonging to either genre, but 
are described as hybrids [12, p. 138] that should be considered a 
genre of their own [45, p. 154]. 
Discussing the generic framework of the immersive 
simulation genre is relevant here because it is unusually well-
defined in several respects, and because the specifics of 
Dishonored 2 and Prey only emerge in the context of these 
parameters. Only a small number of games is classified as 
belonging to the genre, most of which were developed in a 
handful of studios: Looking Glass Studios pioneered the genre in 
the 1990s with the first two System Shock [37] and Thief [38] 
games, and its key creatives went on to form other studios, 
perfecting upon the genre formulas there. After developing the 
CRPG Ultima Underworld: The Stygian Abyss [9] under their 
original name BlueSky Software, Looking Glass and id games 
begun an “arms race” [41] in the development of First-Person 
Shooters. While id software perfected fast-paced action in its 
successors to Wolfenstein 3D [26] and Doom [27], Looking Glass 
were aiming at more complex and sophisticated game systems. 
The core of their game design philosophy was to give the player 
different options to overcome a wide variety of obstacles in 
complex gameworlds. Eventually perfected by Ion Storm – the 
second major studio in the history of the genre – in the first half 
of the 2000s with the first two Deus Ex [28] games and the third 
Thief [29] title, the emphasis of the impact of player choices on 
the gameworld became crucial. To this end, Deus Ex introduced 
to features nowadays strongly associated with the genre, a 
branching narrative and the option to play (mostly) non-
violently. These principles are clearly spelled out in Dishonored 
2, where the first loading screen displays the hint: “There is no 
‘best’ way to play: Focus on combat or stealth, play brutally or 
ghostlike – the world will react” [5]. 
After the eventual demise of Ion Storm, a number of other 
developers continued the legacy of immersive simulation games, 
yet in all these companies, key creatives with a background at 
Looking Glass were responsible for the ongoing development of 
the genre [53, p. 188], including not only Warren Spector, Doug 
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Church, Harvey Smith, Ken Levine, but even Arkane Studios’ 
founder Raphaël Colantonio, who early in his career had worked 
in QA for the original System Shock. As such, the immersive 
simulation genre appears almost as the equivalent of a school of 
game design, preoccupied with probing the depth of not only 
immersion, but, maybe to a greater degree, agency. 
The immersive simulation genre quite literally epitomizes 
Janet Murray’s original definition of agency as “the satisfying 
power to take meaningful action and see the results of our 
decisions and choices” [43, p. 126]. Doug Church, one of the lead 
developers of Looking Glass, proposed a similar concept 
(apparently unaware of Murray’s), in which he outlines two key 
factors for good game design: firstly, the player should to be 
empowered to formulate intentions for actions within the 
gameworld: “This process of accumulating goals, understanding 
the world, making a plan and then acting on it, is a powerful 
means to get the player invested and involved. We’ll call this 
‘intention’” [13]. Secondly, there needs to be a “clear reaction 
from the game world to the action of the player” [13]. These 
reflections upon agency show the level of awareness for the 
phenomenon at Looking Glass, which is palpable also in the fact 
that Church’s description is already quite close to the outcome of 
Wardrip-Fruin et al.’s much later literature review on the topic, 
which defines “agency as a phenomenon, involving both the 
game and the player, that occurs when the actions players desire 
are among those they can take as supported by an underlying 
computational model” [57, p. 7, emphasis in the original]. While 
the differences are subtle, Murray’s vision of agency is more in 
line with consequentialist philosophy of action [15], insofar as it 
characterizes the relationship between player and gameworld 
through an ability to cause desired effects. Church’s (and, it 
might be fair to say, Looking Glass Studio’s) approach is closer 
to intentionalist philosophical positions [3] and decision theory 
[47], in that it distinguishes between intentions and decisions, 
acknowledging that actions are often not based in choices, and 
that outcomes might not always be caused by intentions. In 
other words, already in the early days of the immersive 
simulation genre, its creators were aware that giving the player a 
desired outcome is less important (and potentially less powerful) 
than allowing her to act in different ways that might all turn out 
to be ineffective or irrelevant [14]. 
In-game images 
Dishonored 2 and Prey are, at the time of writing, the latest 
examples of the genre of immersive simulations. Developed 
almost in tandem within the same studio, they share numerous 
design elements and refer to each other in many small, 
throwaway details (such as both offering the player character to 
replenish health with pickled eel snacks). Their interdependence 
goes much further, though, and the different ways in which they 
employ in-game images is one of the elements that highlights 
this conversation about their design principles and the role 
afforded to their players. 
In-game images are, of course, a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
contemporary games in virtual worlds. Diegetic visual aids 
(maps, street signs, evidence boards etc.) as well as world-
building elements (photographs, advertisements, political 
posters, medical imagery (x-rays), newspapers and magazines 
etc.) tend to be scattered around in contemporary gameworlds 
and are used to great effect both in other immersive simulations 
(e.g. Deus Ex: Mankind Divided [17]) and First-Person Shooters 
(e.g. Wolfenstein II: The New Colossus [40]). 
Dishonored 2 and Prey go beyond this conventionalized use of 
in-game images both in terms of scope and use. Both games 
display excessive amounts of the types of in-game images found 
in other games, but also foreground one specific type. 
In each example, one in-game image (or, in a way, imaging 
technology) is of elevated importance. Dishonored 2 has a 
painting entitled “The world as it should be”, which is not only a 
work of art, but a magical artefact with the power to manifest 
the painter’s vision of the world as reality. Prey features an 
augmented-reality technology called ‘Looking Glass’, which is 
obliquely used throughout the game’s narrative to call into 
question the ontological status of events, eventually exposing all 
events of the game as simulation run in the gameworld. 
In-game paintings in Dishonored 2 
The narrative of Dishonored 2 revolves around a political coup in 
the steampunk city Dunwall. In the beginning of the game, the 
villain of the narrative, Delilah Kaldwin, step-sister of the former 
empress, stages a coup against the heiress to the throne. The 
player can choose to play as Emily, the dethroned heiress, or her 
father and bodyguard, Corvo, to try and win the realm back. 
Delilah is a powerful witch, and to solidify her reign, she 
prepares a spell which will form reality according to her ideals 
and wishes. It is the execution of this spell that the whole game 
builds toward, and it is intimately connected to in-game images. 
In Dishonored 2, the visual arts permeate both the physical 
space and the societal discourse of the gameworld. Every house 
and apartment is filled with framed paintings, be they hung, 
stacked, piled, or displayed in glass cases. Statues and figurines 
are just as common, especially if one includes the countless 
animal trophies, taxidermied birds, reptiles, apes, etc., as well as 
the industry and status objects (e.g. harpoons or whaling ship 
models) in display cases. Even early photographic technologies 
are used in the steampunk world of the game, with press 
photographs and carefully staged, often signed black-and-white 
portraits hung in people’s houses. All key figures of the plot 
practice visual arts, be it scientist-inventor Anton Sokolov or 
politician Luca Abele, with Delilah being singled out as the most 
gifted of them all. 
Among all those visual arts elements, paintings occupy a 
privileged position. They are generally representational, tending 
towards a proto-expressionist romantic style (reminiscent of 
Goya and Turner), and serve more than a mere decorative 
function. Many of them have titles attached to their frames that 
connect them to the events and history of the game by explicitly 
referring to specific places or people, characterizing at the same 
time the art practices of the gameworld and contributing to the 
worldbuilding. This is even more pronounced whenever the 
player characters comment upon an image, stressing the 
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individual relevance of the depicted objects in their personal 
history. When player character Corvo Attano recognizes a locale 
from the previous game, Dishonored [4], in a painting and asks 
himself “will it get as bad as those times” (Fig. 1), the player is 
invited to reflect upon her memory of the first game or, if she 
has not played it, imagine the direness of that situation and the 
influence it had an Corvo. Through this simple rhetorical 
gesture, the game not only showcases Corvo’s recollection of the 
first game’s events, but solicits the player’s memories, and 
suggests their (at least partial) congruence. The in-game painting 
thus is both a representation of a class of image with a specific 
social function (to preserve the memory of a historic event), and 
acts as such an image with this exact social function for the 
player. 
 
Fig. 1: Player character Corvo Attano commenting upon a 
painting (in the subtitle) 
The prominence of the visual arts in Dishonored 2 culminates in 
the game’s central plot-point, Delilah’s reality-changing spell. Its 
core element is a painting, entitled “The world as it should be.” 
Delilah’s magic draws its power (apart from occult ingredients 
such as skulls) from art. She combines her witchcraft with her 
artistic practice and is able to reverse the relationship between 
reality and painting, between signified and signifier: Her 
painting can change reality so as to conform to her wishes and 
ideals. The player character’s tasks revolve around foiling 
Delilah’s plans, which can be effected in one of two ways: kill 
her before she can complete the painting, or manage to transport 
only her into her ‘perfect’ world and exile her within it. 
The two options for dealing with this final challenge are the 
final branching point which, in combination with a number of 
other pivotal decisions, determines the overall outcome of 
Dishonored 2. In the tradition of Deus Ex, the game has several 
endings that leave the gameworld more or less just and 
democratic. Although there is a small influence of accidental 
events on the final outcome, it is determined to an 
overwhelming degree by the decisions of the player. The 
feedback on these decisions is abundantly clear and almost 
impossible to ignore. Whenever there is a part of a mission that 
allows for more than one solution with different outcomes, these 
are clearly spelled out both as an overlay to the gameplay and in 
the quest log. At the end of each mission, the performance of the 
player is displayed in a matrix diagram corresponding to the 
ethical dimensions of the gameworld (violence and 
invasiveness). The chosen play style of each mission affects the 
following ones, because one of the central conceits of Dishonored 
2 is that violent actions of the player character are mirrored in 
the development of the gameworld. Play aggressively, and 
buildings or streets in a following mission turn from populated 
and hospitable to derelict and plague-infested. Additionally, 
there is no ending in which Delilah’s plan succeeds, leaving the 
end-state of the game as precisely “the gameworld as it should 
be” according to the plans and actions of the player. While the 
player character prevents the gameworld to become a mirror of 
the villain’s ambition, the player effectively turns it into a mirror 
of hers. 
Augmented and virtual reality in Prey 
Prey is a science fiction scenario set in an alternate timeline from 
ours. Here, the USA and USSR turned their space race into a 
joint venture upon discovering extraterrestrial life. The game 
sets out from a false premise: It initially appears that the player 
character, Morgan Yu, is in San Francisco, undergoing final 
psych evaluations before the journey to the space station Talos I, 
which is owned and operated by Transstar, a company led by 
Morgan’s family. After only a couple of minutes of gameplay, it 
is revealed that Morgan has been on the space station for several 
years already, and has been participating in an experiment on 
the long-term effects of exposure to extraterrestrial tissue. 
Morgan escapes from the simulation environment by smashing 
what appeared to be a window, but turns out to be a screen of 
Transstar’s pioneering AR/VR technology called Looking Glass 
(Fig. 2).  
 
Fig. 2: Breaking out of the initial simulation in Prey 
This technology is explained and demonstrated throughout the 
game, and similar to the magical painting in Dishonored 2, it is 
situated in a context of not only the usual collection of realism-
affirming images – medical screens, product ads, film posters, 
family photos – but a staggering amount of in-game artworks. 
The whole space station is a piece of coherent industrial design, 
mostly executed in a neo-Art Nouveau style, with all 
representation-, reception-, and community-oriented areas being 
decorated with paintings, reliefs, motivational posters, and other 
forms of corporate design. The in-game paintings and sculptures 
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are, for the greater part, much more abstract than those in 
Dishonored 2, mostly non-representational, and often move in 
different aesthetic gray-zones. Bas-reliefs in what appears as 
stone or crystal along some walls call into question what genre 
of art they are and even if they are art in the first place, or rather 
architectonic elements. The predominant abstract style of the 
prominently featured art pieces is mirrored in the omnipresent 
advertisements for Transstar’s products, creating an impression 
of industrial paintings that are unashamed of their calculated, 
persuasive nature of commercial art (including foregrounded use 
of spot colors with swatches in the picture frame). As with most 
of its elements, Prey takes this approach to art to its natural 
conclusion and makes the curation statement for the space 
station’s art collection available in a collectible text file, where 
the borderline-status of the visual art pieces is attributed to them 
having been commissioned from the same former street artist as 
the advertisments (Fig. 3). 
  
Fig. 3: The curation statement in Prey 
The in-game images of the greatest importance in Prey are, 
however, the Looking Glass technology screens. The opening 
gambit of having to smash the screen to escape is followed in 
rather close succession by two main missions which emphasize 
the importance of Looking Glass technology. Morgan needs to 
watch a Looking Glass recording to receive crucial information, 
which is only possible after visiting the laboratory of Dr. 
Calvino, the developer of the technology. In Calvino’s 
laboratory, the technology is not only explained and 
demonstrated, but also made the key to a side quest with a 
considerable reward. Taken together, these elements make sure 
that the significance of Looking Glass technology for the 
gameworld is apparent. It is used throughout the station for 
different purposes, all of which create verisimilitude and have a 
potential for deception. 
At the very end, the game picks up the theme of simulation 
and imprisonment from the beginning. Like Dishonored 2, Prey 
has several endings, yet all but one of them are followed by an 
epilogue that contains a final plot twist. It is revealed that the 
whole game up to this point is, even within the logic of the 
gameworld, a simulation. The player has not been controlling 
Morgan Yu, but an extraterrestrial captured by the last surviving 
humans, who was made to experience Morgan’s attempt to save 
the space station – an attempt which, it is revealed, failed in 
reality. Just like in the opening sequence (that, through the final 
plot twist, is characterized as a simulation within a simulation), 
there is a moral justification for keeping someone in a simulation 
without their knowledge: it is an attempt to find out whether the 
extraterrestrials are capable of empathy, and might thus be 
reasoned with. While the impact of this final revelation on the 
narrative is already massive, it is maybe even bigger on the 
player. All actions and decisions made during play are called into 
question by declaring them a simulation, which would be 
problematic in any game, yet which, within the immersive 
simulation genre, amounts to a slap in the face of the player. 
Simulacra, Self- and Metareferentiality 
The recontextualizations of actions which both games derive 
from ontologically questionable in-game images makes it 
necessary to connect agency to the reality, virtuality, or 
fictionality of gameworlds. Both games raise the question which 
of the player (character)’s actions actually have impact on the 
gameworld, or, in a sense, where the gameworld begins and 
ends, which effects are real (within the logic of the game) and 
which are only imaginary or illusory [42].  
The question of the reality of objects and actions in games is 
obviously a highly complex one that would require a protracted 
discussion for which an article like this offers no room. The 
central problem is that the virtual worlds of digital games use 
“graphical objects as an information interface, enabling the 
player to play with a set of formally defined events”, while, at 
the same time, “events unfold from the player’s interaction with 
concrete models, in a reified, quasi-physical environment. The 
technology of realtime graphics can perform both functions at 
once––as both depictive interface and concrete model––but not 
without conflicts and ambiguities” [34, p. 16]. 
Painting in the broadest strokes, five main understandings of 
the duality of interface and environment can be identified within 
game studies. a) The simplest assumption is that the entirety of 
games [53] or at least, with Jesper Juul, all non-rule elements of 
games [32] are fictional. Declaring them as such removes 
gameworlds to the well-explored realm of fiction and renders 
ontological questions a priori irrelevant. b) From a diametrically 
opposed ontological perspective, the reality-relation of game 
objects and events is anything but clear. For proponents of this 
approach, the real, the fictional, and the virtual can be 
distinguished in accordance to whether an object or action is 
undeniable, is only true with regard to a fictional heterocosm, or 
can be empirically repeated, regardless of whether they exist 
within reality or a virtual world [1, 2]. c) From a media-
technological perspective, it makes sense to distinguish between 
integral parts of simulations, such as system, representation, and 
interface [31], focusing rather on the (semiotically speaking) 
signifiers instead of the signifieds. d) From a poststructuralist 
perspective, the politics of inclusion and exclusion of real-life 
elements in a (necessarily reductive) simulation comes to the 
foreground, stressing their inevitable subjectivity [10, p. 106-
109]. e) Yet ultimately, from the strict perspective of philosophy 
of science, all these questions appear secondary, as the usage of 
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the involved terms (such as ‘simulation’ or ‘virtual’) in game 
studies are so far removed from their original meanings as to 
make all these lines of reasoning questionable. If simulations in 
all other fields require a real-world referent, yet can be 
considered non-referential in games, it is questionable if subject 
matter and/or concepts have any significant overlap [33].  
For the discussion of in-game images, especially with regard 
to agency, the ontological and philosophical perspectives are 
most relevant. As I’ve already discussed, there is one in-game 
image (or, in a way, imaging technology) in each example that is 
of elevated importance, Dishonored 2’s magical “The world as it 
should be”, and Prey’s ‘Looking Glass’ technology. In both cases, 
the pivotal images are important because they problematize the 
referential relationship between image (or, more generally, sign) 
and object, and thus point toward general aporias of digital 
games. 
The central question of whether play and games necessarily 
relate referentially to reality has been answered quite differently 
by existing research. Only in Kendall Walton’s very specific 
usage of the terms [58] are acts of play understood as being 
unambiguously representational: “A teddy bear is a 
representation insofar as that it has the function of being 
implemented in a game of make-believe, a game that might 
involve, for example, going to bed and falling asleep for the 
night” [34, p. 3]. For Walton, representation is something that 
results from games of make-believe, which leads even his 
followers to admit that his “broad concept of ‘depiction’ can also 
be somewhat misleading” [34, p. 5]. A more widely accepted 
understanding of representation in play might be one that uses 
poststructuralist terminology to characterize it as “always 
already simulacral” [20, p. 401], with digital games forming “a 
paradigmatic form of contemporary hyperreality” [20, p. 402]. 
This understanding of games as hyperreal and play as simulacral 
manages to align the game studies understanding of simulation 
with the use in other fields, as it points out that games do not 
simulate a source system to arrive at conclusions about said 
system, but for their own ends, be they entertainment, 
persuasion, or social commentary. It also addresses that “games 
are games because they are fundamentally self-referential” [58, 
p. 219] and that they are part of a “bricolage culture in which 
texts, images, motion pictures, games, commercials, and brands 
cite each other at a rapid pace” [58, p. 220], which gives them a 
very particular relationship to real phenomena they might 
otherwise be said to represent. 
Studying in-game images allows one to looks toward theories 
of representation in the visual arts for inspiration, where 
surprisingly similar reflections can be found. The apparent 
tension between realistic depictions and simulations in digital 
games and their (sometimes non-existent) real-life counterparts 
is something that, according to Edmund Husserl, is negotiated 
when perceiving any kind of picture. Even when confronted 
with a documentary, unaltered, photographic representation of 
reality, the perceiver still has to distinguish between the reality 
of the picture and that depicted by it: 
“It is this “reality” that we are, according to Husserl, 
seeing in the picture […], as opposed to the actual, 
present reality that we see when looking at the picture 
as a physical object. Unlike direct vision through an 
actual window, this image is an aesthetic object 
characteristically produced in the framed surface of the 
Bild as a physical thing.” [34, p. 6] 
Husserl terms this phenomenon image consciousness 
(Bildbewusstsein): when perceiving an image, we are generally 
aware that it is an image, and interpret both its materiality and 
the objects it represents accordingly. Nelson Goodman has 
extended these reflections by asking what this means for 
pictures of mythical or fictional beings. He concludes that the 
perceiver identifies them as a specific class of representations: 
“What, for example, do pictures of Pickwick or of a unicorn 
represent? They do not represent anything; they are 
representations with null denotation” [23, p. 21]. We make sense 
of such pictures regardless, according to Goodman, because we 
have an awareness for this categorical difference, which is 
actually an awareness of two factors: “In representing, a picture 
at once picks out a class of objects and belongs to a certain class 
or classes of pictures” [23, p. 31]. The ontological status of the 
depicted object(s) thus determines how we interpret the sign-
function of a picture, in addition to our awareness of the picture 
being a picture. While it would be a stretch to claim that this 
sufficiently explains the simulacral nature of simulations in 
digital games, the obvious parallels are what allows in-game 
images to foreground the conventionalized aporias of games. 
The in-game images in Dishonored 2 and Prey do this in what 
many might call a ‘breaking of the fourth wall’, yet that 
description would be misleading. Metareferential strategies in 
fiction are diverse: Already in theatre, we can observe a clear 
distinction between the actual breaking of the fourth wall – an 
actor addressing the audience directly, potentially even out of 
character, as is one of the central tenets of Brechtian Epic 
Theater – and the less radically immersion-breaking 
foregrounding of theatrical conventions by staging a play within 
a play. In literature, there is a categorical difference between 
mise-en-abyme – the nesting or repetition of a narrative within 
another – and metalepsis – the breaking of ontological barriers 
between different fictional worlds or the fictional world and 
reality. Even for games, different forms of metalepses have been 
distinguished between player characters directly addressing the 
player and non-player characters referring to the game itself or 
exhibiting awareness of being a game character [48, p. 224-226]. 
These typologies are far from exhaustive, and still other 
distinctions can be made for the visual arts, film, music, etc. [24]. 
German media theorist Werner Wolf has compellingly 
argued that the common denominator of all these phenomena is 
that they are particular forms of referentiality [60]. He broadly 
distinguishes three classes of referentiality: hetero-referentiality 
is the most common form, where a sign points toward something 
that is not part of the same semiotic system (e.g. most words in 
natural language that refer to people, animals, or objects); self-
referentiality is targeted at a sign within the same semiotic 
system (e.g. a rhyme-word in a poem or an intertextual reference 
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between two literary texts); and metareferentiality is a special 
form of self-referentiality which is “located on a logically higher 
level, a ‘metalevel’, within an artefact or performance [and] 
forms or implies a statement about an object-level, namely on 
(aspects of) the medium/system referred to” [60, p. 30-31]. Wolf 
offers up a number of analysis tools for metareferentiality which 
serve to distinguish the different forms (such as metalepsis and 
mise-en-abyme) in a systematic fashion, yet for the purposes of 
this paper, his general distinctions will suffice. Hetero- and self-
referentiality correspond well to Aarseth’s, Karhulahti’s, and 
Walther’s aforementioned observations about the tenuous 
relationship of games to reality. “The world as it should be” and 
“Looking Glass” belong, however, clearly into Wolf’s category of 
metareferentiality: they are elements of digital games that 
highlight properties of digital games. 
In-game images as metareflective devices 
The inversive metalepsis of “The world as it 
should be” 
The ways in which Dishonored 2 uses paintings and sculptures in 
traditions of real-world art-historian and museal practices only 
to radically break with them in “The world as it should be” 
builds upon both Husserl’s and Goodman’s reflections. The 
omnipresence of fine art and its discursive practices (e.g. 
exhibiting, naming) in the gameworld draws attention to the 
parallels between the art-world of the game and that of reality. 
For all its differences from reality, the steampunk society of 
Karnaka uses visual arts in very similar ways and for similar 
functions as real-world Western societies do: to evoke cultural 
values, taste, class, status, and wealth. The paintings in the 
gameworld can be decoded easily, if not unambiguously: the 
painting of a political leader in the game appears as belonging to 
a certain class of painting, priming us to understand the 
depictive conventions and the symbolism of its representation as 
not-quite realistic. While we certainly possess the image 
consciousness to look in instead of at those paintings for the 
greater part, the stealable paintings problematize this facile 
relationship. By making them interactable objects and 
visualizing the act of removing the canvas from the frame (Fig. 
4), awareness is shifted from the object of the painting to its 
materiality. The player is forced to negotiate between image 
consciousness and object perception, between looking in the 
picture to perceive its subject matter and looking at it as an 
interactive object in the environment. 
 
Fig. 4: Empty frame of a stolen painting in Dishonored 2 
This already constitutes a first layer of metareferentiality in 
Wolf’s terms, as it highlights the double nature of game elements 
[34], the depictive interface and the reified object. On its own, 
the metareferential potential of stealable paintings might go 
unnoticed, as this game mechanic has been conventionalized as a 
part of the design language of immersive simulation games 
already in Thief: Deadly Shadows. However, Dishonored 2 
alienates the status of interactive paintings by the central role it 
gives to Delilah’s magical painting “The world as it should be” 
(Fig. 5). For the longest time, the painting is the subject of 
conversations. Only very late in the game, the player actually 
gets to see it. Unlike the stealable paintings, it cannot be 
interacted with immediately, but needs to be prepared by 
sabotaging Leila’s ritual. When interaction becomes possible, it 
is of a literally metaleptic nature, as the avatar changes between 
different ontological levels of the gameworld when transported 
into the world of the painting. In its bizarre version of the 
game’s Dunwall Palace, Delilah can be rendered unconscious, 
eventually exiling her within the painting, foiling her plans in 
the most humane way (because she assumes the world around 
her to be the actual reality of the gameworld, transformed after 
her liking). 
 
Fig. 5: Delilah entering “The world as it should be” 
Expressed in terms of referentiality, the painting is depicting 
Delilah’s imagination. It refers to something imaginary that, 
through an act of magic, is supposed to replace reality. Put 
differently, it is a signifier which refers to an imaginary signified 
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with the goal of manifesting this signified in reality. In the most 
recent monograph on metalepsis, Julian Hanebeck identifies 
such a constellation as the rare phenomenon of inversive 
metalepsis,  
“those rare transgressions in which the hierarchical 
relation of two diegetic universes that are connected 
by an act of narrative representation is unambiguously 
reversed [in] an exchange of the metadiegesis of the 
‘world’ of the diegesis/exegesis (and thus in an 
inversion of their original hierarchical relation) – but 
not in a mutual contamination of levels” [24, p. 105].  
When the player interrupts Delilah’s ritual, this inversive 
metalepsis does not materialize. The “World as it should be” of 
the painting does not replace the reality of the gameworld; it 
does, however, exist as an explorable world – a mise-en-abyme –
, and it is in this world-within-a-world that the player character 
can perform the crucial task that foils Delilah’s plans for the 
reality that the painting and its secondary world are situated in. 
From here, it does not require much interpretive effort to 
identify the in-game painting as a metareferential element of 
Dishonored 2 that turns the game into a simile for digital games 
in general. The player character lives in a world full of political 
intrigue, social injustice, and abuse of power. The way in which 
the player chooses to perform, in accordance with this regime of 
violence or in (comparatively) peaceful subversion of it, 
determines how the world develops, if it will become a better or 
an even worse place. The most crucial action in this world is, 
however, how to deal with attempts at projecting an enforced 
cultural imaginary upon the world. Resistance against the 
regime is ultimately only possible within the realm of the 
hyperreal, which, once properly understood, becomes the locus 
of empowerment, because actions there shape the outside world, 
as well, and prevent the powerful to shape the world in their 
image. Given the parallels between the in-game image outlined 
above and the apparatus of digital games, it is only a small 
substitution to read the political subtext of Dishonored 2 as a 
metaphor of the role of popular culture, and especially games, 
within society, recursively likening the player’s agency in the 
gameworld to their real-life capacity to effect changes, even (and 
maybe especially) through actions in the virtual environments of 
digital culture. 
The total illusion of Looking Glass Technology 
In Prey, the use of in-game imagery is completely different, and 
although Looking Glass Technology in itself is modeled to be 
inconspicuous – it is, after all, mostly used illusionistically to 
create simulations with a total impression of verisimilitude –, its 
metareferential potential is more pronounced. As a digital, 
audiovisual, partially interactive technology, its similarity to 
digital games in general is hard to overlook. The name of the 
technology makes the target of its metareferentiality more 
specific, evoking the immersive simulation genre through the 
metonymy of its original developers. By displaying the name 
frequently on the displays, the image consciousness is partially 
counteracted (Fig. 6): the technology is foregrounded, forcing the 
gaze of the viewer to oscillate between looking at the picture and 
into it (which in this case, is a literal ‘looking into’, as Looking 
Glass screens have a perfect simulation of depth perception, 
giving the appearance of a virtual window into another 
ontological plane). 
 
Fig. 6: The name ‘Looking Glass’ draws attention to both 
the materiality of the image and its content 
The game shows in several instances that the technology is 
content-agnostic: some screens reproduce recordings, others 
render miniature models in real-time, and yet others are fed by 
3D computer simulations. This showcasing of the different 
possibilities for input serves as another reminder of the image 
technology over its content: with Looking Glass, the target of the 
reference is not as important as the availability of the image and 
its verisimilitude. Neither is agency: most of the Looking Glass 
screens are not interactive. 
Rather atypically for an immersive simulation game, although 
the player has many options for dealing with the gameworld’s 
challenges, there is little immediate consequence to this diversity 
of feedback. While Dishonored 2 reacts by (sometimes radically) 
transforming the gameworld to mirror the player’s decisions, in 
Prey, it is mostly the way that agents in the gameworld react to 
the player character which changes. The player can e.g. choose 
to upgrade the avatar with alien tissue to unlock the 
extraterrestrial’s ability to e.g. shapeshift. This means, however, 
that the security turrets which are instrumental in protecting 
from enemies in the beginning of the game will detect the alien 
DNA in the avatar and shoot on sight, inverting their allegiance 
based on the player’s strategic decisions in leveling up the 
character. This reinforces the overall future-orientation of Prey’s 
game design (which again forms a contrast to Dishonored 2’s 
strong emphasis of consequence): Resources, especially the ones 
needed to level up the character, are scarce, making different 
upgrade paths mutually exclusive, and while unlocking 
completely different skill-sets, no upgrade path is intrinsically 
stronger than another. On the contrary: the main decision of 
whether or not to use alien DNA is tied closely to the game’s 
narrative, not only through the overarching plot, but through 
carefully constructed setups. The psych evaluation player 
character Morgan Yu undergoes in the opening sequence of the 
game (i.e. which the extraterrestrial playing her might have been 
undergoing repeatedly for a long period of time) probes 
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Morgan’s (and the extraterrestrial’s) reasoning and humanity 
with several iterations of the notoriously ambivalent trolley 
problem. The philosophical problem – is it ethical to sacrifice the 
lives of a few or of one’s own to save others? – raises 
hypotheticals that have no clear ethical solution, but are often 
taken as indicative of both an individual’s and a society’s value 
system. 
The significance of the trolley problem only becomes 
apparent in the end, when the final plot-twist reveals that the 
whole gameworld has been a simulation. Within the logic and 
moral framework of the gameworld, this test is unethical and 
imperialistic (testing the humanity of an alien), yet at the same 
time coded as a necessary act of desperation, a last-ditch attempt 
at communicating with the alien invaders and saving what 
remains of humanity. As there does not seem to be an 
unequivocally acceptable solution, this conundrum clearly 
resonates with the trolley problem the player gets confronted 
with in the beginning of the game. For the player, this final 
reveal creates a parallelism between her experience and that of 
the alien whom she has been playing: both explore a virtual 
world under a false premise, have to question the relevance of 
their decisions and actions, while the final cut-scene makes a 
strong statement for the relevance and reality of their moral 
decisions. Read metareferentially, this imbues Prey with a very 
strong poetological message: in immersive simulation games, the 
consequences of one’s actions are not as important as the 
reflections and intentions of the player, the reactions of the 
gameworld, and the emotions the tension between the two 
elicits. 
As already argued, the game’s metacommentary does not 
result from breaking the fourth wall. Instead, it reveals the layers 
of its mise-en-abyme structure of nested simulated environments 
until, in the end, it arrives at what appears the ‘actual’ or 
outermost layer. It is through the provocation of declaring all 
actions in the game non-actual that the attentive player is 
prompted to reflect upon the general ‘actuality’ of in-game 
actions, and to realize that Prey problematizes what it means for 
something in a game to be real, virtual, or fictional [2]. When the 
game changes ontological levels after the first few minutes of 
gameplay, revealing Morgan’s apartment to be only a simulation, 
this metalepsis ironically affirms the reality of the ontological 
level the rest of the game takes place. At the same time, the 
opening sleight of hand makes the second re-contextualizing of 
what seemed like intra-ludic reality as a simulation-within-a-
simulation more palpable, as this possibility has been established 
and thus cannot come as a total surprise – especially not in the 
light of the allusive naming of the imaging technology.  
Upon replaying the game, the priming of a metareferential 
reading of the game already begins in the opening title sequence. 
As a part of the simulation within the simulation, Morgan Yu is 
taken by helicopter from the roof of a condo building to 
Transstar headquarters. It is a short flight, during which a (never 
seen) pilot points out some landmarks. The credits for developer 
studio, distributor, the game title and several other pieces of 
information are arranged as huge floating words in-between the 
logotypes and billboards on the facades of the buildings in the 
(doubly virtual) skyline of the alternate-reality, science fiction 
San Francisco. On the first playthrough, this might seem merely 
as an ostentatiously cinematic way of presenting the opening 
credits. Knowing about the narrative’s twists and turns, though, 
the opening credits appear as a rather direct foreshadowing: The 
pilot flies the helicopter in a unnecessarily elaborate path and 
consequently points out landmarks that have credits on or next 
to them in what amounts to the game’s only real breaking of the 
fourth wall, as his remarks are addressed at least as much to the 
player as to the player character. This becomes abundantly clear 
when he bids farewell to his passengers by saying: “Mind the 
glass on the way out. Good luck to you.” (Fig. 7) – in a situation 
where there is no glass anywhere near the helicopter door. The 
pilot’s words address simultaneously Morgan Yu (who will soon 
have to break the glass of the balcony door to escape the 
simulation within the simulation), the extraterrestrial playing 
Morgan in the second simulation (whose mind is trapped inside 
the Looking Glass VR system), and the player (who, by paying 
attention to the Looking Glass technology, might anticipate the 
final plot twist). 
 
Fig. 7: The pilot’s farewell  
Conclusion 
This argument should have shown that in-game images are a 
quite specific tool in the aesthetic repertoire of digital games, 
and that they have been used to great effect in the two discussed 
recent immersive simulation games. 
While Dishonored 2 deals with visualization that creates 
something that does not replace reality, yet shapes it, Prey 
instead exposes the fakeness of its virtual world, only to affirm 
the authenticity of the reactions it elicits. Dishonored 2 uses the 
idea of inversive metalepsis as a negative foil against which it 
positions its gameworlds. Their limited malleability and 
consequentiality form both a metaphor and a model for 
resistance to cultural imperialism, demonstrating through its 
metareferentiality that games which allow for ruminations of 
cause and effect in politics and violence are culturally valuable. 
Prey on the other hand foregrounds and defamiliarizes its own 
audio-visual representation, going so far as to negate the 
relevance and reality of all its events. Instead of focusing (like 
Dishonored 2) on the potential for simulating that games posses 
at least on a symbolical level, Prey crafts a procedural 
congruence between the situation of its player character and its 
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player, stressing intently that the reactions to a game are real 
and relevant, no matter what it is meant to simulate, how well it 
does so, and how much agency players possess. 
Given that both games were developed in close conjunction 
by an overlapping team of developers, their differing positions 
towards the possibilities and significance of their own genre is 
surprising. However, it would be shortsighted to see the games’ 
subtexts in open conflict. Quite on the contrary, they seem to be 
each other’s companion pieces: Dishonored 2 reflecting upon the 
power of agency and consequences, especially as a tool for 
conceptual empowerment in a political setting, and Prey instead 
probing the emotional impact of immersive simulations, even if 
the player is aware that everything is just a game, or a game 
within a game, or a game within a game within a game. Taken 
together, Arkane’s two games give one of the strongest 
testimonies of the maturity and aesthetic rigour Triple-A games 
have reached in recent years. 
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